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Introduction 
A consistent theme in recent years in Supreme Court reporting—
at least that of the “mainstream media” that skews to the left side of 
the American political debate1—has been the notion that the Roberts 
Court2 is unusually “pro business.”3 For example, Adam Liptak, the 
 
†  James R. Copland is a senior fellow with and director of legal policy for the 
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. This Article is adapted from a talk 
given to a symposium at the Case Western Reserve Law School. 
1. See Tim Groseclose & Jeffrey Milyo, A Measure of Media Bias, 4 Q.J. Econ. 
1191, 1191 (2005) (finding a “strong liberal bias” across most major media 
news reporting, with only the Washington Times and Fox News’ Special 
Report more conservative than the median member of Congress, when mea-
sured among twenty media outlets studied). 
2. For these purposes, the “Roberts Court” is defined as the era since John 
Roberts replaced William Rehnquist as Chief Justice of the United States. 
3. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. Times Mag. (Mar. 16, 
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html 
[https://perma.cc/BA4H-QHWH] (“Forty percent of the cases the court heard 
last term involved business interests, up from around 30 percent in recent 
years.”); Alicia Mundy & Shirley S. Wang, In Drug Case, Justices to Weigh 
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lead Supreme Court reporter for The New York Times, reported in 
2013: 
The business docket reflects something truly distinctive about the 
court led by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. While the current 
court’s decisions, over all, are only slightly more conservative 
than those from the courts led by Chief Justices Warren E. Burger 
and William H. Rehnquist, . . . its business rulings are another 
matter. They have been, a new study finds, far friendlier to busi-
ness than those of any court since at least World War II.4 
Liptak’s story was based on an academic study by Lee Epstein, William 
Landes, and Richard Posner published in the Minnesota Law Review.5 
The Epstein, Landes, and Posner study examined all Supreme Court 
cases from 1946 through 2011.6 Rather than coding specific cases as 
“liberal” or “conservative,” the study principally examined cases that 
had one and only one business party and looked at case outcomes.7 In 
addition to concluding that the Roberts Court is friendlier to business 
interests than its predecessors,8 the study also concluded that Chief 
Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito are likelier to vote in 
favor of business interests than any other justices to have served on the 
Court during the past sixty-five years.9 
In this Article, I advance three main observations about these 
claims. In Part I, I argue that there is nothing inherently wrong about 
the Supreme Court being pro-business, at least to the extent that it is 
not favoring “crony capitalism” or the fruits of big-business lobbying 
 
Right to Sue, Wall St. J. (Oct. 27, 2008), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB122506300017470355 [https://perma.cc/V2PC-BJ6F] (“The business lobby 
isn’t hiding its anticipation that the current Supreme Court, one of the most 
pro-business ones in 50 years, will rule in Wyeth’s favor.”); Adam Liptak, 
Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (May 4, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-
defining-this-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/WV6J-PGA2] (“[The 
Roberts Court] ha[s] been, a new study finds, far friendlier to business than 
those of any court since at least World War II.”). 
4. Liptak, supra note 3. 
5. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in 
the Supreme Court, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1431 (2013). 
6. Id. at 1434.  
7. In addition to the principal “Business Litigant Dataset,” the authors also 
constructed a “Business versus Business Dataset” with two business litigants, 
then compared outcomes for “big business” and “small business” litigants. Id. 
8. See id. at 1456 tbl.8 (displaying the percent of pro-business votes under the 
Vinson, Warren, Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts). 
9. See id. at 1451–52 tbl.7 (ranking Supreme Court justices from 1946–2011 based 
on their fraction of votes for pro-business litigants). 
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that generate barriers to entry, but rather reaching decisions that are 
generally applicable and pro-free-market, expanding the economic 
opportunity set for Americans over time. In Part II, I outline some of 
the methodological problems underlying the evidentiary claim that the 
Roberts Court is, in fact, pro-business and give a summary evaluation 
of the Court’s recent docket with respect to business. Finally, in Part 
III, I question the premise and ask if we are placing undue emphasis on 
the Supreme Court, when so much government enforcement power over 
business today exists essentially outside of judicial review. 
I. What’s Wrong with a Pro-Business Court? 
If I should ask you what kind of economic order the Founding 
Fathers contemplated when they established the constitutional 
order, you would doubtless reply capitalism or a market economy. 
If I addressed that question to a similar number of professional 
American historians, the answer would be the same, the difference 
being that most of you would add “Thank God” and most of them 
would add “unfortunately.” 
—Forrest McDonald, Address to the Economic Club of 
Indianapolis, 200610 
[It’s] the economy, stupid. 
—Bill Clinton Campaign Board, 199211 
[T]he chief business of the American people is business.  
—President Calvin Coolidge, Address to the Society of American 
Newspaper Editors, 192512 
 To begin, I want to make the normative claim that a pro-business 
orientation for the Supreme Court—at least as I think pro-business 
should be rightly construed—is something to be applauded, not lamen-
ted. That I should take this normative stance is perhaps unsurprising, 
 
10. Forrest McDonald, Professor of History, Univ. of Ala., The Founding Fathers 
and the Economic Order (Apr. 19, 2006) (transcript available online at http:// 
oll.libertyfund.org/pages/forrest-mcdonald-the-founding-fathers-and-the-
economic-order [https://perma.cc/THN5-Q6ZE]). 
11. Michael Kelly, The 1992 Campaign: The Democrats—Clinton and Bush 
Compete to be Champion of Change; Democrat Fights Perceptions of Bush 
Gain, N.Y. Times (Oct. 31, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/31/ 
us/1992-campaign-democrats-clinton-bush-compete-be-champion-change-
democrat-fights.html [https://perma.cc/5NRS-KYAR]. 
12. Calvin Coolidge, President of the U.S., Address to the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors (Jan. 17, 1925) (transcript available online at http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24180 [https://perma.cc/85KF-6VR6]). 
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given that I have worked for over a decade as a scholar at a think tank 
with a stated mission “to develop and disseminate new ideas that foster 
greater economic choice and individual responsibility.”13 
But this normative posture should hardly be controversial in light 
of our national history: the interests of business clearly underlie the 
American experiment in self-government itself. When the Declaration 
of Independence lists affronts to the colonies in Parliamentary laws 
affirmed by the crown, it lists—after only the quartering of troops and 
trials exonerating the military execution of colonists—trade and tax-
ation; and among the powers claimed for the declared independent 
states—after only matters of war, peace, and treaty—is “establish[ing] 
Commerce.”14 
Similarly, the Constitution of the United States centrally affirms 
not only the right to self-government and the need for a stronger 
national government, but also limitations on that government oriented 
around property and contractual rights. The substantive powers of 
Congress laid out in Article I, Section 8 lay out in sequential order 
taxation, debt, commerce, bankruptcy, money, counterfeiting, infra-
structure, and intellectual property—before turning to matters of adju-
dicatory tribunals, war, and military matters.15 Article I, Section 9 lays 
out specific substantive limitations on federal taxation, commercial reg-
ulations, and appropriations.16 Article I, Section 10 limits states’ ability 
to levy taxes and impair contracts.17 Article VI consolidates in the fed-
eral government state governments’ debts.18 The Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution, proposed through a joint resolution of Congress in 
1789 and ratified in 1791, prohibits the government from depriving 
persons of property without due process of law or from taking “private 
property . . . without just compensation.”19 And in keeping with the 
pro-business focus of the early republic, the economic plans laid out by 
the first U.S. Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, centered around 
government debt, taxation, money, banking, and manufacturing. It 
would be incongruously ahistorical to argue that the American project 
itself and the U.S. Constitution are not suffused with property and 
 
13. Manhattan Inst., https://www.manhattan-institute.org [https://perma.cc/ 
E8BZ-J97R] (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
14. The Declaration of Independence para. 5 (U.S. 1776). 
15. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.  
16. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9. 
17. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. 
18. U.S. Const. art. VI. 
19. U.S. Const. amend. V. 
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business interests—just as anti-business critics of the document have 
long lamented.20 
To be sure, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution “does 
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,”21 and judges and jus-
tices are charged with interpreting laws—not with seeking to maximize 
business profits or economic utility. Still, courts have at least some dis-
cretion in resolving cases of constitutional and statutory interpretation; 
and it would seem to be consistent with American constitutional design 
that they resolve these cases—controlling for ideological and methodo-
logical tenets of constitutional and statutory interpretation—in keeping 
with free-market wealth maximization norms. Indeed, common-law 
judges regularly reached “efficient” legal outcomes, as Posner and 
Landes themselves helped to chronicle decades ago.22 
A pro-business outcome and an efficient outcome are not necessarily 
the same thing. A business litigant may win in litigation—or a busi-
ness’s lobbying team may win in the policy arena, achieving legislative 
or regulatory outcomes—yet achieve inefficient outcomes. Most obvi-
ously, such results can happen when a business secures some sort of 
special favoritism from government or barriers to entry reinforcing an 
existing business’s market power. Indeed, the notion that there is a 
significant distinction between pro-business and efficiency undercuts 
the salience of efforts to draw inferences from pro-business “wins.” 
Cases in which businesses interests are adverse to those of organized 
labor, for example, may be those in which a pro-business outcome is 
deemed a pro-market-efficiency outcome. But in other cases, the success 
of a business litigant is less informative about the ideological and 
market-conforming valence of a decision, as I discuss in more detail in 
Part II. 
 
20. See, e.g., Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution of the United States 73–151 (1913) (detailing the economic 
interests at issue at the Constitutional Convention). Beard’s simplistic neo-
Marxist interpretation got many of the facts and much of the analysis wrong, 
see generally Forrest McDonald, We the People: The Economic 
Origins of the Constitution (1958) (finding that an economic interpreta-
tion of the constitution does not work), but it is unambiguously the case that 
the Founding Fathers sought to establish a pro-business or free-market econo-
mic order. See McDonald, supra note 10 (noting that some of the Founding 
Fathers used the freedoms of the Constitution and its protections to create 
a capitalistic, free-market economy). 
21. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
22. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 98–102 (7th 
ed. 2007) (discussing the economic underpinnings of contract jurisprudence); 
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & Econ. 
61 (1971) (using economic theory and statistics to analyze the criminal justice 
system). 
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Before turning to a discussion of the methodological difficulties in 
assessing whether the Roberts Court (or any Supreme Court) is pro-
business, I would like to emphasize that the normative case for efficient, 
pro-business outcomes rests not only on ideology or history, but also 
empirically demonstrable current trends that mitigate against “anti-
business” policies or case outcomes. Notably, U.S. productivity growth 
has slowed down over the last forty-five years—and even more in the 
current business cycle, in which productivity growth and hours worked 
have trended well below other business cycles in the post-WWII per-
iod.23 Alongside these trends, the number of publicly traded companies 
in the United States has fallen dramatically, down from 8,025 in 1996 
to 4,102 in 2012.24 The number of U.S. public-company listings in 2012 
were fourteen percent below the number in 1975; non-U.S. listings in-
creased 219% over the same period.25 Smaller businesses have found it 
increasingly difficult to list publicly;26 the number of U.S. initial public 
offerings valued at less than $75 million fell from 168 in 1997 to seven 
in 2012.27 Although there is disagreement about the underlying causes 
of these trends, there is little doubt that they have a significant effect 
on the broader economy.28 And in light of these trends, it would be 
troubling if the Supreme Court were lurching in an anti-business 
direction. 
II. Methodological Difficulties in Assessing 
Whether the Roberts Court Is Pro-Business 
Empirically assessing judicial behavior is hard. To begin with, it is 
often hard to determine what counts as a “win” in a legal case. Of 
course, one party wins and the other loses. But a legal win may result 
 
23. See Shawn Sprague, Below Trend: The U.S. Productivity Slowdown, U.S. 
Bureau of Lab. Stats. (Jan. 2017), https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume 
-6/below-trend-the-us-productivity-slowdown-since-the-great-recession.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6YYC-DY58] (studying labor productivity and the business 
cycle in the post-World War II era). 
24. See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stultz, The U.S. Listing 
Gap 2, 9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21181, 2015) 
(discussing the rise and fall of U.S. listings). 
25. Id. at 9. 
26. Id. at 17–20. 
27. Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Where Have All the IPOs Gone?: 
The Hard Life of the Small IPO, 6 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 83, 84 (2016). 
28. See Jonathan Macey, Opinion, As IPOs Decline, the Market is Becoming 
More Elitist, L.A. Times (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/ 
op-ed/la-oe-macey-ipo-democracy-20170110-story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
QT2W-NVHS] (explaining how both initial public offerings and small institu-
tional investors will begin fading in importance). 
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in an effective loss—and a win in a given piece of litigation may never-
theless entail the creation of a legal rule that disadvantages a litigant’s 
“side” in prospective litigation. Merely counting cases and assessing 
whether outcomes are “pro-business” or “anti-business” based on whe-
ther a business litigant wins the case misses many steps of necessary 
analysis. 
In addition, not all cases are of equal importance. A court may rule 
for business in nine out of ten cases, but the tenth case’s legal rule could 
be vastly more harmful to business prospects than the nine cases com-
bined. And narrowing the scope of cases to those with a business litigant 
omits many important cases; cases that do not involve a business liti-
gant may have vastly broader implications for business than most—or 
all—that do. 
Finally, intertemporal comparisons of judging are extremely sus-
pect. Judges resolve disputes, but they do not set the terms of those 
disputes. Rather, judges react to cases that come before them. If the 
government is increasing regulations in one period and scaling them 
back in another, the mix of cases coming before the courts reflects those 
differences. A Court may hold the exact same legal position but rule in 
opposite sides in a case in which a business challenges a government 
action—the only difference being the underlying action itself. Moreover, 
over time, judges set precedents that establish new baselines for the 
law. A court in period two may hold the exact same legal position as a 
court in period one, but the court in period one votes to expand liability 
and the court in period two not to expand it further. In short, doctrinal 
direction matters, not the outcomes of given cases. 
Given this backdrop, the Epstein, Landes, and Posner study used 
an innovative methodology and underscored some of the weaknesses in 
earlier research that had relied on “liberal” and “conservative” scoring 
of Supreme Court decisions.29 But the Epstein, Landes, and Posner 
study’s careful critiques of prior classifications in the often-used Spaeth 
Database only serves to highlight the problems in any such classifi-
cation—including their own.30 All empirical studies of judging behavior 
necessarily make simplifying methodological assumptions, which can 
lead to results that are incomplete, if not misleading. 
A. How Do You Count “Wins?” 
Students of statistical analysis in other disciplines understand that 
a “win” is not, in and of itself, particularly informative. In sports, the 
best-quality models tend to look not just—or at all—at wins or losses, 
which contain much statistical noise and a heavy element of random 
chance. Team A and Team B may have identical records, but if Team 
A has a much larger average margin-of-victory, then—controlling for 
 
29. See Epstein et al., supra note 5, at 1437–73. 
30. Id. at 1435. 
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other factors such as schedule strength, location of matches, or injuries 
and lineup changes—it is pretty safe to say that Team A is a better 
team and is likely to beat Team B in future contests. Similarly, in 
electoral polling data, if one wants to have an accurate prediction of 
future outcomes, it is important to look not only at who’s up and who’s 
down but projected margins of victory, margins of error, and other indi-
cators of uncertainty—something pundits assessing the 2016 British re-
ferendum on the European Union (“Brexit”) and the 2016 U.S. presi-
dential election often ignored.31 
The same holds true in assessing litigation. The seminal case in U.S. 
constitutional jurisprudence, Marbury v. Madison,32 highlights the com-
plications in assessing who wins and who loses.33 A more modern case, 
involving the newly inaugurated president of the United States, high-
lights the difficulty in assessing “who wins?” in the business litigation 
context. In 1986, the upstart United States Football League (USFL)—
prompted by the owner of the league’s New Jersey Generals, a young 
Donald Trump34—litigated an antitrust action against the venerable 
National Football League.35 Although the USFL “won” its case, it was 
a pyrrhic victory: the jury awarded the USFL only $1 in damages, 
trebled.36 The league promptly dissolved, never playing another down 
of football.37 
 
31. David Millward, How the Pollsters Got the US Election Wrong—Just Like 
Brexit, Telegraph (Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/ 
11/09/how-the-pollsters-got-the-us-election-wrong---just-like-brexit/ [https:// 
perma.cc/UT22-S46C] (considering polling errors that may explain why poll-
sters inaccurately predicted the results of the 2016 "Brexit” referendum and 
2016 U.S. presidential election). 
32. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
33. The Supreme Court found that Mr. Marbury did have a legal right to his 
commission to office but that Congress had exceeded its constitutional au-
thority in granting the Supreme Court the power to issue Mr. Marbury’s 
sought-for writ. Id. at 168, 176. The Court for the first time clearly asserted 
its power of judicial review over the federal government—while nominally 
granting a win to the new Jefferson administration. Id. at 177. 
34. Jeff Horwitz, Donald Trump Once Sued the NFL as an Owner of a Largely 
Forgotten Football Team, Bus. Insider (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www. 
businessinsider.com/donald-trump-sued-nfl-as-usfl-team-owner-2016-2 [https: 
//perma.cc/449T-FQJR]. 
35. See Richard Hoffer, USFL Awarded Only $3 in Antitrust Decision: Jury Finds 
NFL Guilty on One of Nine Counts, L.A. Times (July 30, 1986), http:// 
articles.latimes.com/1986-07-30/sports/sp-18643_1_jury-finds-nfl-guilty 
[https://perma.cc/YWN5-QQ44] (discussing the United States Football 
League’s case against the National Football League over antitrust violations). 
36. Id. 
37. Joe Nocera, Donald Trump’s Less-Than-Artful Failure in Pro Football, N.Y. 
Times (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/20/sports/ 
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In short, a simple assessment of which party in a given piece of 
litigation “wins” is not always illustrative. The nominal winner of the 
case, as in the USFL action, may be the effective loser. Moreover, even 
a significant win for a single business litigant in a single case may mask 
a shift in doctrine that undercuts broader business interests. The new 
Jefferson administration technically won the case in Marbury v. 
Madison; but the far more significant shift in the law was the Court’s 
assertion of judicial review, which limited the scope of future actions by 
the Congress and executive branch.38 
B. Equal Weighting of Unequal Cases. 
Any methodology that counts unequal results equally is necessarily 
skewed. In the investment context, this is easy to see. If an investor 
loses his money in nine out of ten cases but reaps a hundredfold profit 
on the tenth investment, he is doing very well indeed. This is indeed 
very much the business model venture capitalists and other “home run” 
focused investors use. The converse is also very true. A family might 
make strong returns on its retirement pension plan, scattered across 
scores of companies’ securities, but if it loses its house or closely held 
business—with an equity valued at many multiples of the whole pension 
portfolio—its overall investment position has worsened, not improved, 
even if it’s won in the majority of “investment” cases. 
The same is true, of course, in business litigation. Although the 
Supreme Court’s certiorari review ensures that cases considered by the 
Court have at least some broad import—the Court is likely to turn 
away low-stakes cases—that does not mean that all the Court’s cases 
are of equal import.39 The Roberts Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly40 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,41 which heightened pleading standards 
in federal civil litigation, obviously have broad business impacts 
(though Iqbal notably lacks a business litigant—and thus would not be 
counted in the Epstein, Landes, and Posner methodology). But so too 
 
football/donald-trumps-less-than-artful-failure-in-pro-football.html [https:// 
perma.cc/7B7Z-BS7E]. 
38. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Standing Still in the Roberts Court, 59 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 1061, 1066 (2009) (“Where the rights of individuals are at 
stake, the judiciary is within its element and properly exercises the authority 
of judicial review, even if that means second-guessing or over-ruling the actions 
of a coordinate branch.”). 
39. Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-
federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-
resources/supreme-1 [https://perma.cc/T93X-M4X2] (last visited Mar. 27, 
2017) (explaining that the Court only grants a writ of certiorari where “the 
case could have national significance”). 
40. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
41. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
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would Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,42 a “business on business” 
case in which the Court left intact the basic system of “fraud-on-the-
market” securities class action litigation, and Wyeth v. Levine,43 in 
which the Court refused to preempt a state-law failure-to-warn claim 
based on FDA labeling input. Each of these cases has far greater busi-
ness impact than most considered by the Supreme Court. Considering 
each equal to all others, in the context of business impact, is the equi-
valent of weighing Apple and a small-capitalization company equally in 
measuring the movement of a market index.44 
C. Doctrinal Direction Matters 
As the Marbury example illustrates, doctrinal direction matters 
much more than “wins” or “losses.” Consider a newly recognized, judi-
cially created cause of action that makes it easier for individuals to sue 
a business. If lower courts improperly apply the doctrine—either narr-
owing its scope or expanding it—the Supreme Court may grant cert-
iorari to clarify the new doctrine. If the lower courts have been too 
narrow, the Court’s decision—which represents no change—would gen-
erate a false pro-business negative; and if the lower courts have been 
expanding the doctrine, the Court’s decision—which again represents 
no change—would generate a false pro-business positive. If even one 
lower appellate court is issuing rulings that aggressively push the enve-
lope on new avenues for litigation, that expand regulatory authority, or 
the like—say, for instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals—then 
the Supreme Court may be saying “no” but merely reflecting the status 
quo. In other words, a pro-business reading on the Supreme Court at 
any given point in time may merely reflect an anti-business sentiment 
on a court of appeals. The same could be true of variations in propensity 
to grant certiorari on business-related cases: the number of Supreme 
Court cases that may reflect the Court’s desire to move the law in a 
pro- or anti-business direction, but it also may reflect the desire of a 
lower court to do so. 
Similarly, different sessions of Congress and different presidencies 
act differently. Although modern constitutional jurisprudence gives 
Congress a very wide berth to pass commercial laws,45 Executive 
 
42. 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2425 (2014). 
43. 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009). 
44. Epstein, Landes, and Posner do attempt to weight for important cases some-
what by separating out a dataset involving only cases reported on by The 
New York Times. Epstein et al., supra note 5, at 1434–35. This effort, though 
laudable, does not eliminate the broader problem.  
45. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that Congress can regulate 
purely intrastate, but noncommercial, activity); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
111 (1942) (holding that Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause 
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce). 
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Branch power in this sphere is more cabined.46 But presidencies may 
vary over time in their propensity to act through executive actions and 
orders without clear Congressional authorization, through agency 
rulemaking, and through enforcement actions. Again, it is not clear if 
the Supreme Court taking business-related cases reflects a change in 
judicial policy or a change in policies undertaken by the elected 
branches of government. (The same analysis holds for state-related 
policy decisions subject to federal review.) 
D. Review of Methodological Concerns 
In summary, I am skeptical of empirical efforts to characterize Sup-
reme Court decision-making—certainly that which makes intertemporal 
comparisons. Epstein, Landes, and Posner, as well as other scholars 
undertaking such efforts, have labored mightily to measure objectively 
that which is not, in my view, objectively measurable. Their erudition 
is impressive, but I fear that it tends to paint an inaccurate picture. In 
the final sentence of their article, they make the following claim: 
We find that after the appointment of Roberts and Alito, the 
other three conservative Justices on the Court became more fa-
vorable to business, and we conjecture that the three may not 
have been as interested in business as Roberts and Alito and deci-
ded to go along with them to forge a more solid conservative 
majority across a broad range of issues.47 
Perhaps—though such strategic voting behavior would seem very odd 
for Justice Thomas, at a minimum. An alternative explanation—and to 
me, the far more likely one—is that the qualitative mix of cases changed 
from one period to the other.48 
 
46. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding 
that the President did not have the authority to issue an executive order 
that took possession of and operated national steel mills). 
47. Epstein et al., supra note 5, at 1473. 
48. Elsewhere in their paper, Epstein, Landes, and Posner offer what seems to 
me a more plausible hypothesis for the pro-business “shift” of the “conser-
vative” justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas in the Roberts Court era—
one much more along the lines I posit, i.e., a different case mix before the 
Court. Id. at 1448–70. Under the authors’ methodology, not only do the 
“conservative” legacy justices become more pro-business in the Roberts 
Court era, but the “liberal” justices become more anti-business. Id. at 1470. 
The authors posit: “A possible explanation is that the increasing conservatism 
of the Court resulted in the Court’s taking cases in which the conservative 
position was weaker than previously, leading to more opposition by liberal 
Justices and hence to a higher percentage of liberal votes by those Justices 
in business cases.” Id. Setting aside the normative claim that a case is definit-
ionally “weaker” if it draws opposition from Ruth Bader Ginsberg or Stephen 
Breyer, it certainly may be the case that the Supreme Court’s docket over 
the Roberts Court period drew a different mix of cases that explains those 
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E. A Holistic Discussion of the Roberts Court’s Business Doctrine 
Stepping back from the empirical efforts to characterize the Roberts 
Court’s behavior, how might we assess the Court’s decision-making 
with respect to business? Looking at the more significant cases on the 
docket, it is rather clear that the Court has taken steps to pare back 
perceived civil-litigation abuses in some areas—notably pleading stand-
ards, class certification, and substitution of private arbitration for con-
sumer class-action enforcement. More broadly, however, the case is 
quite mixed. The Court declined to pare back securities class action 
litigation (but also declined to broaden it), largely resisted Executive 
Branch efforts to preempt state failure-to-warn claims that underlie 
most mass tort product liability claims, left relatively unfettered the 
scope of Congressional power, and expanded the scope of regulatory 
authority without limiting agency rulemaking authority. 
Pleading standards. Perhaps the broadest-reaching decisions of 
the Roberts Court era favoring business are Twombly49 and Iqbal,50 
which at least in theory affect every civil suit by clarifying minimum 
pleading standards.51 In reality, these cases are “outer bound” cases—
litigants in the broad run of cases will not find their causes of action 
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)—but they do afford businesses to weed 
out the most frivolous causes of action pre-discovery and thus represent 
a clear business win. Notably, the business case Twombly was a 7–2 
decision written by Justice David Souter—a Republican appointee 
deemed “liberal” by most scholars—and joined by Clinton appointee 
Stephen Breyer.52 In the non-business case Iqbal—which involved a suit 
against federal officials in the prosecution of the “war on terror”—the 
justices split 5–4, with Souter and Breyer both in dissent.53 
Class certification. In a pair of cases, Wal-Mart v. Dukes54 and 
Comcast v. Behrend,55 the Supreme Court clarified minimum class-
certification standards. Although the Court ruled unanimously in Wal-
 
justices’ shifting votes. Of course, that shift could be attributable to changes 
in lower-court decision-making—or changes in the scope of Congressional, 
Executive Branch, or state actions—rather than strategic decisions on the 
part of the Court’s right-leaning justices. 
49. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
50. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
51. See William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading, 83 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 693, 694–96 (2016) (describing the impact of the Twombly and Iqbal 
decisions on everyone within the legal community). 
52. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547. 
53. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 665. 
54. 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
55. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
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Mart that the class action did not meet minimal commonality require-
ments for a monetary class claim, the Court split 5–4 over whether an 
injunctive class claim might proceed.56 The broader implications of this 
holding are to charge district courts with making some fact-related in-
quiries that also involve the merits of the case, at the certification stage, 
to determine whether Rule 23’s certification standards are met. Clearly, 
these cases represent a significant win for business defendants facing 
prospective class litigation. 
Arbitration. In a pair of cases, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion57 
and American Express v. Italian Colors,58 a divided 5–4 Court inter-
preted the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to require courts to 
enforce private arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, even when 
such clauses foreclosed class litigation or arbitration.59 Concepcion held 
that the FAA preempted California state law precluding enforcement 
of arbitration clauses that did not leave open a class remedy and Italian 
Colors enforced an arbitration class waiver under the FAA in the 
context of federal antitrust law.60 Again, these cases represent clear wins 
for business—although also, at least arguably, for consumers.61 
Securities class actions. Although the Supreme Court’s Roberts-
era class certification and arbitration decisions have helped business 
defendants avoid at least some class-action litigation, in Halliburton Co. 
v. Erica P. John Fund,62 the Court declined to revisit the “fraud on the 
market” theory it had articulated in Basic v. Levinson,63 a theory 
underlying most federal securities class actions. It also, however, 
declined to expand securities class action liability by creating aiding 
and abetting liability in Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta.64 Thus, the 
Roberts Court has been essentially a status quo court in this area of 
law. 
 
56. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 340. 
57. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
58. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
59. Id. at 2312; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344. 
60. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352. 
61. See Ted Frank, Manhattan Inst., Class Actions, Arbitration, and 
Consumer Rights: Why Concepcion is a Pro-Consumer Decision 
(2013), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/lpr_16.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/SA8H-AP87] (finding claims that mandatory arbitration agreements 
deny consumer protections overwrought). 
62. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
63. 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988). 
64. 552 U.S. 148, 163–64 (2008). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
What Do We Mean By a "Pro-Business" Court—And Should We Care? 
756 
Preemption. In a pair of cases, Riegel v. Medtronic65 and Wyeth 
v. Levine,66 the Supreme Court reached different outcomes in claimed 
federal preemption of state product liability litigation. Because Riegel 
involved only a subset of medical devices and Levine involved the much 
broader class of pharmaceutical products, the Levine case was far more 
significant. Levine held that federal law did not preempt a state-law 
failure-to-warn product-liability claim even when a long-existing phar-
maceutical product had a label that had been extensively reviewed by 
the Food and Drug Administration for three decades.67 In the pre-
emption drug and device space—which constitutes a large fraction of 
the mass-tort docket in and out of federal multidistrict litigation 
courts—the Supreme Court’s decisions have been on balance anti-busi-
ness in the Roberts Court era.68 
Government regulatory power. In the Court’s most significant 
case involving Congressional power in the Roberts Court era, it upheld 
most of the Affordable Care Act in response to a Commerce Clause 
challenge in NFIB v. Sebelius.69 Interestingly, a 5–4 Court majority de-
termined that the law’s individual mandate to purchase health insur-
ance, as a form of compelled commerce, exceeded Congress’s authority 
under the Commerce Clause; but Chief Justice Roberts “saved” the 
statute by construing a regulatory penalty as a tax, invoking the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance.70 The Chief Justice’s reasoning, 
however, appears to belie his Epstein, Landes, and Posner rank as one 
of the two most pro-business justices in the history of the postwar 
Court, given the share of the U.S. economy affected by the health care 
sector broadly impacted by the law and the fact that four of his colle-
agues dissented from the holding.71 Similarly, in interpreting executive 
agency power under longstanding statutory law, the Supreme Court in 
Massachusetts v. EPA—a case again without a business litigant—ruled 
that the Environmental Protection Agency is compelled to consider car-
bon dioxide as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act.72 This was an ex-
pansive statutory reading affecting much of the U.S. economy. Thus, in 
 
65. 552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
66. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
67. Id. at 561–62, 81. 
68. Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Rise of “Empty Suit” Litigation: 
Where Should Tort Law Draw the Line?, 80 Brook. L. Rev. 599, 630–33 
(2015) (explaining the basis for mass tort litigation against pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in the United States). 
69. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
70. Id. at 2608. 
71. Id. at 2575. 
72. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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the two cases with perhaps the broadest economic reach in the Roberts 
Court, business interests lost. 
III. Is the Emphasis on the Supreme Court Missing a 
Big Part of the Picture? 
Assuming arguendo that there has been a pro-business shift in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence under the Roberts Court, I would argue 
that the significance of such a shift—and indeed of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence itself—can be overstated. The Supreme Court and the 
judiciary more broadly have indeed inserted themselves into a broader 
array of government decision-making than in the past—certainly vis-à-
vis the elected federal branches, in comparison with the pre-twentieth-
century era. But vast swathes of legal activity occur essentially “un-
seen” by the courts, actually or effectively immune from judicial review. 
Two areas of my research—the rise of federal deferred prosecution 
agreements governing large business enterprises and the increasing use 
of shareholder proxy proposals under guidelines promulgated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission—highlight this reality.73 
A. The Rise of the Shadow Regulatory State 
Who runs the world’s most lucrative shakedown operation? The 
Sicilian mafia? The People’s Liberation Army in China? The 
kleptocracy in the Kremlin? If you are a big business, all these 
are less grasping than America’s regulatory system. The formula 
is simple: find a large company that may (or may not) have done 
something wrong; threaten its managers with commercial ruin, 
preferably with criminal charges; force them to use their 
shareholders’ money to pay an enormous fine to drop the charges 
in a secret settlement (so nobody can check the details). Then 
repeat with another large company. 
—The Economist, August 201474 
 
73. See generally James R. Copland, Manhattan Inst., The Shadow Reg-
ulatory State: The Rise of Deferred Prosecution Agreements 
(May 5, 2012), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/shadow-
regulatory-state-rise-deferred-prosecution-agreements-5895.html [https:// 
perma.cc/48HH-VKU6] (describing the growing reliance on deferred prose-
cution agreements between the Department of Justice and U.S. businesses); 
see also James R. Copland, Against an SEC-Mandated Rule on Political 
Spending Disclosure: A Reply to Bebchuk and Jackson, 3 Harv. Bus. L. 
Rev. 381 (2013) (discussing the drawbacks of SEC-mandated disclosures of 
corporate political spending). 
74. Editorial, The Criminalisation of American Business, Economist (Aug. 28, 
2014), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21614138-companies-must-
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One of the remarkable features of the law since 2004 is the rise in 
what I and my colleagues have dubbed the “shadow regulatory 
state”75—the federal practice of negotiating deferred prosecution agree-
ments (DPA) and non-prosecution agreements (NPA) with businesses.76 
To understand DPAs and NPAs: 
[DPAs and NPAs are] pretrial diversion programs that the federal 
government has increasingly used to resolve criminal allegations 
against large publicly traded companies. NPAs are entered into 
before a charge is formally levied; DPAs are entered into after a 
charge has been filed. Although DPAs may generally be more 
complex and involve higher fines and penalties, the principal dis-
tinction between the two types of agreements is nomenclature and 
procedure, rather than substance.77  
DPAs and NPAs give government attorneys tools to modify, control, 
and oversee corporate behavior that they would never achieve by taking 
the companies to court.78 Notwithstanding these extraordinary powers, 
these agreements lack transparency and judicial oversight.79 
 
be-punished-when-they-do-wrong-legal-system-has-become-extortion [https:// 
perma.cc/869T-ZRWU]. 
75. See Copland, supra note 73 (“Over the last decade, a novel form of federal 
government regulation has emerged, prompted not by new congressional 
legislation or administrative agency action but rather by aggressive assertion 
of prosecutorial authority over business.”); see also James R. Copland & 
Rafael A. Mangual, Manhattan Inst., Justice Out of the Shadows: 
Federal Deferred Prosecution Agreements and the Political 
Order 5 (June 2016), https:// www.manhattan-institute.org/html/justice-
out-shadows-federal-deferred-prosecution-agreements-8980.html [https:// 
perma.cc/656X-GCQ9] (recognizing the federal practice of using deferred 
prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements to control corporate 
behavior as the defining feature of “the shadow regulatory state”); James 
R. Copland & Isaac Gorodetski, Manhattan Inst., Without Law or 
Limits: The Continued Growth of the Shadow Regulatory State 
1–3 (Mar. 2015), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/without-law-
or-limits-continued-growth-shadow-regulatory-state-5899.html [https://perma 
.cc/UBZ8-BHB7] (explaining the emergence of prosecution and, subsequently, 
settlements, as a force to regulate business); James R. Copland & Isaac 
Gorodetski, Manhattan Inst., The Shadow Lengthens: The Con-
tinuing Threat of Regulation by Prosecution 1–2 (Feb. 2014), http: 
//www.manhattan-institute.org/html/shadow-lengthens-continuing-threat-
regulation-prosecution-5898.html [https://perma.cc/LKB2-LGZS] (“[O]ver 
the last decade, the DOJ and other federal agencies have entered into at 
least 278 [DPAs and NPAs].”). 
76. Copland, supra note 73. 
77. Copland & Mangual, supra note 75, at 5. 
78. Copland & Gorodetski, supra note 75, at 2. 
79. Id. at 14. 
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The shadow regulatory state covers a vast swathe of American busi-
ness. Since the beginning of 2010, the federal government has entered 
into DPAs or NPAs with the parent companies or subsidiaries of 17 of 
the 100 largest U.S. companies by revenues, as ranked by Fortune 
magazine: Archer Daniels Midland, CVS Health, Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, General Electric, General Motors, Google/Alphabet, Hewlett-
Packard, Johnson & Johnson, JPMorgan Chase, Merck, MetLife, 
Pfizer, Tyson Foods, United Parcel Service, United Technologies, and 
Wells Fargo.80 In 2015, the federal government entered into 100 such 
agreements, a record.81 
Federal DPAs and NPAs with corporations are novel. The first was 
entered into between the DOJ and Salomon Brothers in 1992, the last 
year of the George H.W. Bush administration.82 “Since then, their num-
bers have grown dramatically. Eleven DPAs and NPAs were entered 
into during the first Clinton administration, 130 during the George W. 
Bush administration, and 290 during the first seven years of the Obama 
administration.”83 
Why do companies enter into DPAs and NPAs, given the severity 
of the terms that they often include? In many cases, they have little 
choice: various federal statutes contain collateral consequences in the 
event of a corporate criminal conviction, or even indictment—including 
debarment from government contracts, exclusion from reimbursement 
under government-run health programs, or loss of licenses required to 
operate84—that would constitute an effective corporate death sentence 
for the company facing prosecution. After the federal government indi-
cted the former “Big Five” accounting firm Arthur Andersen in 2002 in 
a prosecution related to its bookkeeping for the defunct energy firm 
Enron, the partnership quickly collapsed;85 that the U.S. Supreme Court 
 
80. Compare Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Prosecu-
tion Agreements, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/ 
Garrett/prosecution_agreements [https://perma.cc/76EK-ZNYC] (cata-
loguing federal organizational prosecution agreements) with List, Fortune 
500, http://beta.fortune.com/fortune500/list [https://perma.cc/U4Q2-
TNYF] (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (listing the companies on the Fortune 500 
list for 2015). 
81. Copland & Mangual, supra note 75, at 4. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. See, e.g., Causes for Debarment, 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (2015) (explaining how 
a contractor can be debarred from a government contract); 42 U.S.C. § 
1320a-7 (2012) (detailing how individuals are excluded from participating in 
Medicare and State health care programs); 7 U.S.C. § 252 (2012) (outlining 
when the government may suspend or revoke a license). 
85. Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Arthur Andersen and the Temple of Doom, 37 Sw. U. L. 
Rev. 97, 99–107 (2008). 
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ultimately overturned the accountancy’s conviction86 offered little so-
lace to its displaced employees, customers, and creditors. 
Prosecutors find DPAs and NPAs especially appealing “because 
they avoid the risk of an Andersen-style corporate collapse and avoid 
the risk of trial but also because these agreements afford government 
attorneys tools to modify, control, and oversee corporate behavior that 
they could never achieve through actual adjudication of criminal 
claims.”87 During a question-and-answer session at the Launch of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Foreign 
Bribery Report, U.S. Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell 
admitted as much: 
Companies cannot be sent to jail, so all a court can do is say you 
will pay “x.” We can say: “you will also have a monitor and will 
do all sorts of other things for the next five years, and if you don’t 
do them for the next five years then you can still be prosecuted.” 
. . . In the United States system at least it is a more powerful tool 
than actually going to trial.88 
In 2015, companies paid out more than $6 billion to the federal 
government under DPAs and NPAs, without any adjudication or judi-
cial oversight, but the “fines” are the least-unusual parts of these agree-
ments.89  
Were DPAs and NPAs limited to extracting monies from the cor-
porate coffers, they would approximate normal criminal-law prac-
tices in which defendants regularly agree to avoid prosecution 
through paying civil penalties or various other types of trial di-
version or plea arrangements. DPAs and NPAs that the govern-
ment reaches with companies, however, involve significant over-
sight and supervision— even dramatic restructurings of business 
practice.90 
 
86. Arthur Andersen LLP v. U.S., 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005). 
87. Copland & Gorodetski, supra note 75, at 2. 
88. Thomas R. Fox, DPAs and NPAs – Powerful Tools in the Fight Against 
Corruption, FCPA Compliance and Ethics Blog (Dec. 8, 2014), https:// 
tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2014/12/08/dpas-and-npas-powerful-tools-in-the-
fight-against-corruption/ [https://perma.cc/UWY7-EE7A] (citing Rahul 
Rose, Caldwell: Settlement a “More Powerful Tool” than Convictions, Global 
Investigations Rev. (Dec. 3, 2014), http://globalinvestigationsreview.com/ 
article/2121/caldwell-settlement-more-powerful-tool-convictions [https:// 
perma.cc/3SZ7-M3GY]). 
89. Copland & Mangual, supra note 75, at 4. 
90. Id. 
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Among the changes the DOJ has required of companies through DPAs 
and NPAs are: 
• Firing key employees, including chief executives and directors; 
• Hiring new corporate officers; 
• Hiring corporate “monitors” independent of the company and 
reporting to the prosecutor; 
• Modifying existing compensation plans; 
• Redesigning sales and marketing practices; 
• Implementing new training programs; 
• Adopting exhaustive reporting requirements to the prosecutor; 
and 
• Limiting corporate speech and litigation strategies.91 
As discussed in earlier writings, “[n]o such changes to business practice 
are authorized by statute. Nor would they be a punishment available 
to the government after a corporate conviction.”92 
The federal government’s shadow regulatory state effected through 
DPAs and NPAs obviously departs from the normal administrative pro-
cess, in which regulation is cabined by carefully defined rulemaking 
procedures, with notice and comment periods and clear channels for 
judicial review.93 In contract, “modifications to corporate conduct en-
abled through DPAs and NPAs . . . accord prosecutors powers that 
they would lack, were they able to convict a company at trial—and 
lack any mechanism for judicial oversight to the agreements’ substan-
tive terms.”94 
The lack of judicial review over DPAs was clarified in a recent de-
cision by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which in April 2016 gran-
ted a writ of mandamus vacating a district court order that had rejected 
a DPA between the government and Fokker Services B.V., a Dutch 
aerospace services provider.95 Although the company fired its president 
and demoted or reassigned other employees who had been involved in 
self-disclosed illegal transactions, the district court judge had objected 
that its 18-month DPA term was too short and its $21-million monetary 
penalty (the gross income from all the involved transactions) was too 
lenient.96 The appellate decision determined that the Speedy Trial Act’s 
review power “did not empower the district court to disapprove the 
 
91. Id. at 4, 6. 
92. Id. 
93. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012) (requiring 
notice and comment for administrative rulemaking). 
94. Copland & Mangual, supra note 75, at 14. 
95. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 167 (D.D.C. 2015), 
vacated and remanded, 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
96. Id. at 166, 167. 
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DPA based on the court’s view that the prosecution had been too le-
nient,”97 and the court emphasized the “constitutionally rooted prin-
ciples” that protected the executive branch’s “exercise of discretion over 
the initiation and dismissal of criminal charges.”98 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the federal government’s use 
of extraordinary settlements to resolve cases through DPAs and NPAs 
parallels similar aggressive use of civil settlements—often with higher 
sums involved, and usually with the threat of potential criminal actions 
lurking. Many of the most extreme such cases in recent years emanated 
out of the 2008 financial crisis, including an August 2014 agreement 
reached between the Department of Justice and Bank of America, for 
a record $16.65 billion.99 The agreement, as with similar large settle-
ments with JPMorgan Chase ($13 billion) and Citigroup ($7 billion), 
resolved claims alleging that Bank of America improperly concealed the 
risks of mortgage-related securities when it sold them to large institu-
tional investors before and after the financial meltdown.100 In sum, in 
resolving claims stemming from the crisis, the Department of Justice 
reached unadjudicated civil settlements with banks totaling $60 
billion.101 
The Bank of America settlement not only pays out almost $10 bill-
ion to the federal and state governments,102 but forces the bank to allo-
cate $7 billion to “consumer relief” credits, including: 
• Loan principal write-downs, with a minimum of $2.15 billion 
for nonperforming loans and a cap of $3 billion for performing 
and home-equity loans (“extra” credits can be awarded under 
certain conditions);103 
• Loans underwriting new “affordable housing” developments, 
with a minimum of $100 million allocated (and substantial 
 
97. Fokker Servs., 818 F.3d at 741. 
98. Id. at 738. 
99. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bank of America to Pay $16.65 Billion 
in Historic Justice Department Settlement for Financial Fraud Leading up 
to and During the Financial Crisis (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.justice 
.gov/opa/pr/bank-america-pay-1665-billion-historic-justice-department-
settlement-financial-fraud-leading [https://perma.cc/6SRP-YMCR]. 
100.  Alanna Petroff, DOJ vs Big Banks: $60 Billion in Fines for Toxic Mortgages, 
CNN Money (Dec. 23, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/12/23/ 
investing/banks-fines-mortgages/ [https://perma.cc/LR8S-ZZNF]. 
101. Id. 
102. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 99. 
103. Settlement Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of Justice along with the States 
and Bank of America annex 2 at 2, 5 (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www 
.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/8492014829141239967961.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/5KU5-9CYV]. 
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extra credits awarded on a dollar-for-dollar basis to discharge 
toward the $7 billion consumer-relief total);104 and 
• Grants to community-development and housing groups; the 
bank must give a minimum of $50 million to community-
development funds or institutions, $30 million to legal-aid 
groups fighting foreclosures, and $20 million to various 
government-sanctioned housing-activist groups.105 
As these breakdowns suggest: 
[A]lmost half the “fines” imposed on Bank of America in its civil 
settlement are not payments to the government but rather “con-
sumer relief” payments directed by the DOJ. These distributions 
are not restitution payments to victims of Bank of America’s alle-
ged conduct, the array of sophisticated institutional investors that 
the bank was accused of misleading when selling them securities 
packaging bundles of home mortgages. Instead, Bank of America’s 
consumer-relief money under the settlement agreement goes to 
forgiving principal on consumers’ home loans, for giving money 
to various administration-favored nonprofit groups (including 
housing and other community-activist and legal-aid organiza-
tions), and for funding “affordable” housing developments for 
low-income families.106 
The extraordinary powers assumed by the federal government 
through DPAs and NPAs, and their civil-settlement analogues, high-
light just how much power the government has assumed over business 
outside the purview of the courts. Like the well-known rise in plea bar-
gaining in ordinary criminal cases, the government’s novel use of threa-
tened criminal-enforcement powers to modify wholesale business 
practices—a use that has veritably exploded in the Roberts Court era—
is a dramatic shift in how the law is shaping businesses completely 
beyond the scope of Supreme Court case resolution. 
B. The Rise of Social Activism by Proxy107 
Eliot Spitzer, former New York Governor and Attorney Gen-
eral, stated,  
 
104. Id. at 8. 
105. Id. at 7. 
106. Copland & Gorodetski, supra note 75, at 16–17. 
107. Portions of this Section are reprinted from my previous testimony before 
Congress. Hearing on Corporate Governance: Fostering a System that Pro-
motes Capital Formation and Maximizes Shareholder Value, Statement to 
the House Comm. On Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Spon-
sored Enters., 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (testimony of James R. Copland, Director 
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Ownership trumps regulation. And yet we haven’t seen 
shareholder activism. We have not seen shareholders stand up 
and collectively say: “Wait a minute. We own the companies. 
Let’s see if we can not [sic] just rein in [chief executive] compen-
sation, which is a piece of it, but also more importantly, make 
wise decisions about management and participation.108 
Another legal mechanism increasingly reshaping corporate 
America—completely unreflected in the Supreme Court’s docket—is 
social activism by shareholder proxy. Under proxy rules promulgated 
by the SEC, publicly traded companies must include shareholders’ pro-
posals on their proxy ballots—to be voted on by all shareholders at 
corporate annual meetings—if such proposals conform to certain pro-
cedural and substantive requirements.109 Under the SEC’s rules, 
 
and Senior Fellow, Center for Legal Policy, Manhattan Institute for Policy 
Research). 
108. Karen Tumulty, Eliot Spitzer Looks for Political Redemption in New York 
City, Wash. Post (July 8, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
eliot-spitzer-looks-for-political-redemption-in-new-york-city/2013/07/08/ 
e3d1ee66-e805-11e2-8f22-de4bd2a2bd39_story.html?utm_term=.50bfbc0 
8b41b [https://perma.cc/3CV8-LY46]. 
109. Stockholders of publicly traded companies who have held shares valued at 
$2,000 or more for at least one year can introduce proposals for shareholders’ 
consideration at corporate annual meetings. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007). 
The federal Securities and Exchange Commission determines the procedural 
appropriateness of a shareholder proposal for inclusion on a corporation’s 
proxy ballot, pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Ch. 404, 48 
Stat. 881, 894–95, 899–901 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n, 
78u (2012)) and the Investment Company Act of 1940, Ch. 686, 54 Stat. 
789, 841 (1940) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37 (2012)) but the 
substantive rights governing such measures and how they can force boards 
to act remain largely a question of state corporate law. As the Supreme Court 
emphasized in its 1987 decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., “[n]o prin-
ciple of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State’s 
authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define 
the voting rights of shareholders.” 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1986). The section of the 
Securities Exchange Act upon which Rule 14a-8 is promulgated, § 14(a), is 
principally designed to ensure corporate disclosures to shareholders to afford 
investment information and prevent deception. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 
U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (“The purpose of § 14(a) is to prevent management or 
others from obtaining authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive 
or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation.”). In its 1990 Business Round-
table decision, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained further:  
That proxy regulation bears almost exclusively on disclosure 
stems as a matter of necessity from the nature of proxies. Proxy 
solicitations are, after all, only communications with potential 
absentee voters. The goal of federal proxy regulation was to 
improve those communications and thereby to enable proxy 
voters to control the corporation as effectively as they might have 
by attending a shareholder meeting. 
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sponsoring shareholders may hold very small stakes: a shareholder need 
only own $2,000 of stock for one year to introduce a proposal.110 
In recent years, and to an unprecedented degree, “a small subset of 
shareholders has been turning to this shareholder-proposal process to 
pursue social and political changes outside normal legislative and ad-
ministrative channels.”111 Even though long-standing corporate-law 
doctrines seek to align the incentives of companies’ boards and manage-
ments exclusively with share value,112 the SEC specifically allows 
shareholders to introduce proposals focusing on social or political issues 
with an attenuated—if any—relationship to share value.113 “In 2016, 
 
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“While the 
House Report indeed speaks of fair corporate suffrage, it also plainly identifies 
Congress’s target—the solicitation of proxies by well informed insiders 
‘without fairly informing the stockholders of the purposes for which the 
proxies are to be used.’” (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1383, at 14 (1934))). See also 
S. Rep. No. 792, at 12 (1934) (characterizing purpose of proxy protections as 
ensuring stockholders’ “adequate knowledge” about the “financial condition 
of the corporation”). 
110. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007). 
111. James R. Copland & Margaret M. O’Keefe, Manhattan Inst., An 
Annual Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder 
Activism 5 (2016), http://www.proxymonitor.org/pdf/pmr_13.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/DDR3-BVGL]. 
112. Traditionally, corporate law has oriented corporate boards and managers’ 
fiduciary duties around a single variable, share value, see Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 683–84 (Mich. 1919) (holding that corporate 
fiduciary duties flowed to shareholders, not employees or other interests), 
which avoids the ownership costs—chiefly conflicts of interest that arise among 
various owners—inherent in non-corporate ownership forms. See generally 
Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise 35–49 (1996) (arguing 
that the costs of collective decision making best explain the predominance of 
the corporate equity-ownership form in large-scale for-profit enterprise); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 
UCLA L. Rev. 601 (2006) (arguing that increasing shareholder power imposes 
significant costs and reduces managerial authority). Since shortly after Dodge 
v. Ford was decided, an academic debate has proliferated between those 
arguing for a social responsibility for corporations, see, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, 
Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 
1148 (1932) (arguing for the view that “the business corporation [i]s an eco-
nomic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making 
function”), and those supporting the traditional rule centered on share value. 
See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A 
Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365, 1367 (1932) (discussing theories directing 
corporate motivations). 
113. In 1976, the SEC issued an interpretive release stating that companies could 
invoke the “ordinary business exclusion” rule to exclude shareholder proposals 
only if these proposals “involve business matters that are mundane in nature 
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fully half of all shareholder proposals introduced at publicly traded For-
tune 250 companies involved social or policy concerns.”114 
For each of the last eleven years tracked in the Manhattan Insti-
tute’s Proxy Monitor database,115 a small group of shareholders has 
dominated the process of introducing shareholder proposals: 
First, a few individuals and their family members—often referred 
to as “corporate gadflies”116—repeatedly file substantially similar pro-
posals across a broad set of companies. Typically, these individuals own 
 
and do not involve any substantial policy or other considerations.” See Adop-
tion of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange 
Act Release, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,998 (Dec. 3, 1976). 
114.  Copland & O’Keefe (2016), supra note 111, at 5. 
115. The Proxy Monitor database contains all shareholder proposals for the 250 
largest publicly traded companies by revenues, as listed by Fortune magazine. 
Hearing on Corporate Governance, supra note 107, at 2. These companies 
constitute a substantial majority of the total stock market capitalization held 
by diversified investors. Id. Notwithstanding this fact, some shareholder acti-
vists and their supporters have objected to Proxy Monitor data on the grounds 
that many companies that receive shareholder proposals are not included in 
the database. See, e.g., Heidi Welsh, Accuracy in Proxy Monitoring, Harvard 
Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance and Fin. Reg. (Sept. 16, 2013), 
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/09/16/accuracy-in-proxy-
monitoring-2/ [https://perma.cc/8S7A-YV6Z] (“[T]he Proxy Monitor data-
base has significant limitations and does not present a comprehensive picture 
of corporate engagement by investors.”). A broader dataset, however, risks 
obscuring the impact of shareholder-proposal rules on the average diversified 
investor, given the broad variance in market capitalization among companies. 
Even among the large companies comprising the Proxy Monitor dataset, 
there are significant variations in market capitalization; the five largest com-
panies in the Fortune 250 have a combined market capitalization almost 
eighteen times as large as companies 246 through 250 on Fortune’s list. (The 
five largest companies by revenues in the 2015 Fortune 500 list—Walmart, 
Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Berkshire Hathaway, and Apple—had a combined 
market capitalization of more than $1.7 trillion on September 1, 2016, which 
constitutes 7.6% of the U.S. total stock market capitalization, based on the 
Wilshire 5000 Price Full Cap Index. The companies listed as 246 through 
250 on the list—DTE Energy, Ameriprise Financial, VF, Praxair, and J.C. 
Penney—had a combined market capitalization of $96 billion, or 0.4% of the 
U.S. total stock market capitalization. Overall, the S&P 100 alone contains 
more than 54% of the U.S. total market capitalization.) Id. Thus, from the 
average shareholder’s perspective, the Proxy Monitor data set paints a signi-
ficantly more accurate picture than do the vote tallies of most shareholder 
activists, who simply straight-line-average votes across a much larger data 
set of companies, without regard to market capitalization. 
116. See Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and 
Executive Pay, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1867, 1895 n.78 (1992) (providing a 
definition for “corporate gadflies”); Jessica Holzer, Firms Try New Tack 
Against Gadflies, Wall St. J. (June 6, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052702304906004576367133865305262.html [https://perma.cc/ 
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very small percentages of a company’s stock. For instance, John 
Chevedden, the most-active sponsor of shareholder proposals dating 
back to 2006, has made substantially the same proposal at Ford Motor 
Company each of those years, individually or through a family trust.117 
In its 2016 proxy statement, Ford disclosed that Mr. Chevedden owned 
500 shares of the company’s stock—an investment valued at $6,750 at 
the close of trading on the company’s March 16 record date—approxi-
mately 0.00001% of the company’s market capitalization.118 “All told, 
Mr. Chevedden and four individual gadfly investors and their family 
members sponsored 29% of all shareholder proposals from 2006–15.”119 
Second, institutional investors focusing on “socially responsible” in-
vesting, which expressly concern themselves with social or political 
issues apart from solely share-price maximization, are very active in 
sponsoring shareholder proposals.120 Such investors include special-
purpose social-investing funds, as well as policy-oriented foundations 
 
647Q-TXTX] (describing certain shareholder activists, including John 
Chevedden, as a corporate gadfly). 
117. James R. Copland, Proxy Monitor, Companies Fight Back Against 
Chevedden; Unions and Social Investors Ramp Up Push on 
Corporate Political Spending (2014), http://proxymonitor.org/forms/ 
pmr_07.aspx [https://perma.cc/3NCE-KAMP]. 
118. Ford Motor Co., Proxy Statement (14A), Proposal No. 5 (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/37996/000104746914003150/a2
218659zdef14a.htm [https://perma.cc/UVQ6-P56H]. 
119. Hearing on Corporate Governance, supra note 107, at 8. 
120. See Michael Chamberlain, Socially Responsible Investing: What You Need to 
Know, Forbes (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/feeonlyplanner/ 
2013/04/24/socially-responsible-investing-what-you-need-to-know [https:// 
perma.cc/8CKJ-S6UR] (“In general, socially responsible investors are looking 
to promote concepts and ideals that they feel strongly about.”). The modern 
push for “corporate social responsibility” generally traces to a pair of 1970s 
books. See Christopher D. Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social 
Control of Corporate Behavior (1975) (discussing the societal effects 
of corporation’s behaviors); Ralph Nader et al., Taming the Giant 
Corporation (1976) (exploring the power of large corporations and what 
options exist to control them). For a critique of the early concept of corporate 
social responsibility advocated by these authors, see David L. Engel, An 
Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 98 (1979) 
(“Any mandatory governance reforms intended to spur more corporate 
altruism are almost sure to have general institutional costs within the corporate 
system itself . . . . But the proponents of ‘more’ corporate social responsibility 
have never bothered to analyze or examine, from any clearly defined starting 
point, even just the benefits they anticipate from reform . . . .”). 
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and various retirement and investment vehicles associated with reli-
gious or public-policy organizations.121 Such investors sponsored 27% of 
all shareholder proposals across the ten-year period from 2006 through 
2015.122 Many of these investors, like corporate gadflies, sponsor share-
holder proposals in companies in which they have very small invest-
ments. For instance, in 2016, a social investor known as Holy Land 
Principles, Inc. sponsored shareholder proposals, relating to employ-
ment practices in areas governed by Israel and the Palestinian Author-
ity, on the ballots of seven of the 231 Fortune 250 companies to hold 
annual meetings by the end of August. In each case, its investment was 
a miniscule percentage of the company’s outstanding market capitali-
zation; in Pepsico, it owned a reported 55 shares,123 worth $5,932.85 on 
the company’s February 26 record date—approximately 0.000003% of 
the company’s market capitalization. 
Finally, apart from investors with a social or policy orientation, the 
principal institutional investors involved with sponsoring shareholder 
proposals are labor-affiliated pension funds—including “multiemployer” 
plans affiliated with labor unions such as the American Federation of 
Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) or American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), as 
well as state and municipal pension plans, particularly those represen-
ting New York City and State. Overall, labor-affiliated investors spon-
sored 32% of all shareholder proposals from 2006–15. Typically, these 
plans have substantial investment stakes in the companies at which 
they file shareholder proposals, though the private labor unions have 
been known to file such proposals from investment vehicles with small 
holdings. For example, in 2016, the AFL-CIO sponsored a human-
rights-related proposal at Mondelez International, but reportedly held 
only 925 shares,124 valued at $38,803.75 on the March 9 record date, 
approximately 0.00006% of the company’s outstanding market capi-
talization.125 
 
121. Religious organizations’ pension plans are generally exempt from the fiduciary 
requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 29 
U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2012). 
122. Hearing on Corporate Governance, supra note 107, at 8. 
123. PepsiCo, Notice of 2016 Annual Meeting of Shareholders and 
Proxy Statement 77 (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.pepsico.com/docs/ 
album/Investor/297606_pepsico_webready_w8xpqnzcnaxknax.pdf?sfvrsn
=0 [https://perma.cc/PS88-7CMB]. 
124. Mondelez Int’l, Inc., Proxy Statement (14A), Proposal No. 6 (Mar. 28, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1103982/000119312516518809/
d119433ddef14a.htm#toc119433_57 [https://perma.cc/7VJE-7HV8]. 
125. Labor unions may choose to engage in socially oriented shareholder activism 
through small-investment vehicles rather than multiemployer private pension 
plans to avoid fiduciary strictures of ERISA, which govern their investment 
approaches, unlike state and municipal plans or religious plans. See 29 U.S.C. 
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Only 1% of shareholder proposals introduced in the decade between 
2006 and 2015 involved institutional investors without a labor affilia-
tion or social, religious, or policy focus. 
Although shareholder proposals are commonly introduced at large 
publicly traded companies, they very rarely garner majority shareholder 
support.126 Among the companies in the Fortune 250, not a single 
 
§ 1003(b) (2012) (detailing the exceptions from ERISA). This approach may 
or may not shift going forward, given the Department of Labor’s Interpretive 
Bulletin 2015-01, an October 2015 rule broadening the fiduciary scope for 
private pension plans’ investments in “economically targeted investments.” 
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in 
Considering Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,135 (Oct. 
26, 2015). 
126. In determining shareholder support for shareholder proposals, the Manhattan 
Institute counts votes consistent with the practice dictated in a company’s 
bylaws, consistent with state law. Some companies measure shareholder sup-
port by dividing the number of votes for a proposal by the total number of 
shares present and voting, ignoring abstentions. Other companies measure 
shareholder support by dividing the number of favorable votes by the 
number of shares present and entitled to vote—thus including abstentions 
in the denominator of the tally. Neither practice necessarily skews shareholder 
votes in management’s favor: whereas the latter method makes it relatively 
more difficult for shareholder resolutions to obtain majority support, it also 
makes it more difficult for management to win shareholder backing for its own 
proposals, such as equity-compensation plans. 
 Although shareholder-proposal activists prefer to exclude abstentions consis-
tently in tabulating vote totals, without regard to corporate bylaws—which 
necessarily inflates apparent support for their proposals—such a methodology 
is inconsistent with federal law. The SEC’s Schedule 14A specifies that for 
“each matter which is to be submitted to a vote of security holders,” corporate 
proxy statements must “[d]isclose the method by which votes will be counted, 
including the treatment and effect of abstentions and broker non-votes under 
applicable state law as well as registrant charter and by-law provisions”—
clearly indicating that corporations can adopt varying counting methodologies 
in assessing shareholder votes and that state substantive law governs the 
parameters of vote calculation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2015). 
 Under the state law of Delaware, in which most large public corporations are 
chartered, “the certificate of incorporation or bylaws of any corporation au-
thorized to issue stock may specify the number of shares and/or the amount 
of other securities having voting power the holders of which shall be present 
or represented by proxy at any meeting in order to constitute a quorum for, 
and the votes that shall be necessary for, the transaction of any business.” 
Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 216. As a default rule, absent a bylaw specification, 
Delaware law specifies that “in all matters other than the election of directors,” 
companies should count “the affirmative vote of the majority of shares of such 
class or series or classes or series present in person or represented by proxy at 
the meeting,” Id., —the precise inverse of shareholder-proposal activists’ pre-
ferred counting rule. 
 The SEC staff proposed but did not adopt a rule that for the very limited 
purpose of determining whether a proposal has met the “resubmission thres-
hold” to qualify for inclusion on the next year’s corporate ballot—a permissive 
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shareholder proposal involving social or policy concerns won majority 
shareholder support over board opposition over the entire 2006–15 
period. In 2016, one of 155 shareholder proposals with a social or policy 
purpose won majority (52%) shareholder backing: a politics-related pro-
posal at Fluor Corporation that sought disclosure of “[p]olicies and pro-
cedures for making, with corporate funds or assets, contributions and 
expenditures (direct or indirect) to (a) participate or intervene in any 
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for 
public office, or (b) influence the general public, or any segment thereof, 
with respect to an election or referendum,” as well as disclosure of 
amounts given to each identified recipient and the corporate officer res-
ponsible for decision-making.127 
The success of the shareholder proposal on political spending at 
Fluor is the exception, in receiving majority shareholder support, but 
make no mistake: activists have been able to influence corporate 
behavior through shareholder proposals of this sort. As previously 
reported: 
In 2003, Bruce Freed, a former Democratic congressional staffer, 
founded an organization, the Center for Political Accountability 
(CPA), exclusively to “campaign for corporate political disclosure 
and accountability.” Dating back to 2006, the first year covered 
in the Proxy Monitor database, at least 19 shareholder proposals 
on companies’ political engagements have been placed on Fortune 
250 corporations’ proxy ballots each year.128 
 
standard requiring merely a minimum 3%, 6%, or 10% vote, respectively, in 
successive years, see Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 29,106, 29,108 (May 28, 1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (describing 
the proposed threshold updates),—“[o]nly votes for and against a proposal 
are included in the calculation of the shareholder vote of that proposal,” 
ignoring abstentions. S.E.C. Division of Corporate Finance: Staff Legal 
Bulletin No. 14 (July 13, 2001), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14.htm 
[https://perma.cc/A7RX-XB4J]. Because this is a staff rule not voted on by 
the Commission; because it exists for a limited purpose (with multiple ra-
tionales, including reducing workload in processing 14a-8 no-action petitions 
and adopting a permissive standard for ballot inclusion); and because it con-
travenes clear and longstanding deference to substantive state law in the field 
of corporate governance, the notion that this limited SEC staff vote-counting 
rule should dictate counting methodology, irrespective of state law and govern-
ing corporate bylaws, is untenable. 
127. Fluor Corp., Proxy Statement (14A), Proposal No. 4 (Mar. 10, 2016). 
128. Copland & O’Keefe (2016), supra note 111, at 5; see also About Us, Ctr. 
for Pol. Accountability, http://politicalaccountability.net/about/about-
us [https://perma.cc/78ZU-ZVJ5] (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (highlighting 
CPA’s mission and achievements). 
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The number of such proposals started to increase after the Supreme 
Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commis-
sion,129 which determined that independent political expenditures were 
speech protected by the First Amendment, even if funded by for-profit 
corporations. The number of political-spending-related shareholder pro-
posals peaked in 2014, when sixty-seven Fortune 250 companies faced 
a proposal on this topic.130 
Across the 2006–16 period, fully 53% of shareholder proposals 
related to corporate political spending have been sponsored by labor-
affiliated pension funds—representing interests that themselves spend 
heavily on the political process, often in opposition to corporations. 
State and municipal pension funds—including the two most-active 
sponsors of these types of proposals, the funds for public employees in 
New York City and State—are often wholly or significantly controlled 
by partisan elected officials whose political interests may be adverse to 
corporations’ interests. Indeed, my prior research has shown that labor-
affiliated pension funds’ sponsorship of such shareholder proposals has 
tended to target companies whose executives and political action 
committees gave disproportionately to Republicans.131 Aside from 
labor-affiliated investors, most political-spending-related shareholder 
proposals have been sponsored by social-investing funds, which by 
definition are not oriented solely around share value and may have 
social or policy goals opposed to the corporations they are targeting. 
The public record amply demonstrates that many of the same 
sponsors of shareholder proposals seeking additional corporate disclos-
ures of political spending also seek to influence corporations to disassoci-
ate from trade associations or to dissuade such groups from taking posi-
tions contrary to the special-interest sponsors’ particular political pre-
ferences. For instance, in January 2011, leaders of the AFL-CIO Office 
of Investment, Domini Social Investments, Green Century Capital 
Management, the Nathan Cummings Foundation, and Trillium Asset 
Management—each a regular sponsor of political-spending-disclosure 
shareholder proposals—all co-signed a letter sent to thirty-five 
companies serving on the board of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
 
129. 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010). 
130. Hearing on Corporate Governance, supra note 107, at 25. 
131. See James R. Copland & Margaret M. O’Keefe, Manhattan Inst., 
Proxy Monitor: A Report on Corporate Governance and Share-
holder Activism 2 (2014), http://www.proxymonitor.org/pdf/pmr_09.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A8ZN-KDR3] (“The 43 Fortune 250 companies facing 
shareholder proposals sponsored by labor-affiliated investors in 2014 were 
twice as likely to orient their political efforts to support Republicans than 
was the average Fortune 250 company. A majority of shareholder proposals 
sponsored by labor-affiliated investors in 2014 have involved corporate political 
spending or lobbying, and only one company targeted by these proposals 
gave more money to Democrats than Republicans.”). 
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urging the companies “to evaluate” their role with the trade association 
and objecting to the Chamber’s “education and lobbying efforts to 
defeat legislative [sic] and regulation related to climate change, con-
sumer protection and financial reform.”132 Former New York City Com-
ptroller John Liu, who manages the city’s five pension funds for retired 
public employees, sent a similar letter to at least one company in which 
the funds invested.133 Bruce Freed’s CPA has both led and joined coali-
tion letters pressuring companies to vocalize disagreement with trade 
association political positions.134 It is hard to escape the conclusion that 
the highly politicized push for greater corporate disclosures surrounding 
political spending and lobbying is about political rather than financial 
goals. And judging from the CPA’s assessments of its impact, it is suc-
ceeding in changing companies’ behavior, even if not winning share-
holder proxy votes themselves: “More than 150 large companies—in-
cluding more than half of companies in the influential S&P 100—have 
struck political disclosure agreements with CPA and/or its shareholder 
partners.”135 
Of course, the role of corporate money in politics is one of the most 
hotly debated issues in the public sphere today. My point is not to 
weigh in on the merits of one side or the other of the debate in this 
Article, but rather to point out that the terms of the debate—as with 
many others—are affected profoundly through use of legal processes 
outside the sphere of cases that ever reach the Supreme Court’s docket. 
And social activism by shareholder proxy, like the shadow regulatory 
state, is having a significant impact on company behavior. 
Also, as with DPAs and NPAs, social activism by shareholder proxy 
seems to be adversely affecting companies—and impacting share 
value.136 To assess this specific empirical claim, the Manhattan Institute 
commissioned an econometric study by Tracie Woidtke, a professor at 
 
132. Letter from Timothy Smith, Senior Vice President, Walden Asset Mgmt., to 
James Mulva, Chief Exec. Officer, ConocoPhillips (Jan. 18, 2011), http:// 
mercyinvestmentservices.org/storage/documents/Chamber_of_Commerce
_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM7Z-SGX6]. 
133. Press Release, John C. Liu, N.Y.C. Comptroller, Comptroller Liu Calls on 
Siemens AG to Cut Ties to U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Jan. 24, 2011 1:06 
AM) (available from LexisNexis Academic). 
134. See CPA Leads Effort to Press Companies on Climate Change Misalignment; 
Company Cuts Chamber Dues, Ctr. for Pol. Accountability News-
letter (Nov. 2009) (on file with Case Western Reserve Law Review) 
(describing CPA’s efforts to address trade association’s positions on climate 
change). 
135. Our Impact, Ctr. for Pol. Accountability, http://politicalaccountability. 
net/impact [https://perma.cc/4ZSD-NJ2W] (last visited Mar. 6, 2016). 
136. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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the Haslam College of Business at the University of Tennessee.137 Build-
ing on a research methodology initially developed for her doctoral diss-
ertation, Woidtke examined the valuation effects associated with 
pension fund influence, measured through ownership, on Fortune 250 
companies, from 2001 to 2013.138 Firm value was assessed through 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, with various controls added to the an-
alysis, including firm leverage, research and development expenses, ad-
vertising expenses, index membership, assets, positive income, stock 
transaction costs, insider ownership, and year fixed effects.139 Woidtke 
found that “public pension funds’ ownership is associated with lower 
firm value” and, more particularly, that “[s]ocial-issue shareholder-pro-
posal activism appears to be negatively related to firm value.”140 
Conclusion 
In this Article, I have advanced three arguments concerning whe-
ther the Roberts Court is pro-business in orientation. First, I make the 
normative claim that a pro-business orientation is not a negative, but 
rather something to be applauded in light of U.S. productivity and 
financial-market trends. Of course, not all pro-business decisions are 
alike, and those that affirm government-erected barriers to entry or 
other examples of crony capitalism should not be applauded, notwith-
standing that they affirm a “win” for a business litigant. But whether 
or not the “chief business of the American people is business,”141 a pro-
business or pro-market orientation is in keeping with our national 
founding and constitutional order. 
Second, I raise methodological critiques of the effort to measure the 
Supreme Court’s orientation vis-à-vis business over time. Although the 
Supreme Court has control over its docket, it does not have direct con-
trol over the decisions of lower courts, of Congress, of the Executive 
Branch, or of states. Moreover, not all cases are of equal import—and 
counting them equally biases any empirical inquiry into the Court’s 
orientation, even if there is no non-subjective way to weight cases differ-
ently. Weighing major cases in the Roberts Court era holistically paints 
 
137. For the professor’s biography, see Department of Finance: Tracie Woidtke, 
U. Tenn. Knoxville, http://finance.bus.utk.edu/Faculty/TWoidtke.asp 
[https://perma.cc/M9U9-MXMT] (last visited Apr. 2, 2017). 
138. Tracie Woidtke, Manhattan Inst., Public Pension Fund Activism 
and Firm Value 3 (Sept. 2015), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/sites 
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a mixed picture. In cases involving pleading standards, class certifica-
tion, and arbitration clauses, businesses have scored significant wins, 
but there was little change in the law involving securities class actions, 
and business lost major litigation involving the preemption of pharma-
ceutical product liability claims that constitute a large fraction of the 
mass-tort MDL docket.142 Business interests lost what were perhaps the 
two most significant business cases in the Roberts era—granting the 
EPA authority to regulate carbon emissions and affirming the Afford-
able Care Act that reshaped the health-care sector.143 
Finally, I challenge the premise of the question presented by argu-
ing that much government legal and regulatory power over business 
occurs outside the Supreme Court’s purview. By invoking the threat of 
prosecution and exploiting the massive collateral consequences facing 
large corporations under indictment, the federal government since 2004 
has established a “shadow regulatory state” outside the substantive re-
view of the judiciary.144 Through shareholder-proposal rules under the 
auspices of the SEC—but never reviewed by the Supreme Court—
social-issue activists have seized upon the corporate proxy process to 
reform large publicly traded companies’ behavior.145 The focus on the 
Supreme Court is an understandable conceit of professors who think 
themselves ideally suited for the nation’s highest bench, but it misses a 
great deal of the real-world legal action. 
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